Beliefs, Points of View, and Multiple Environments by Wilks, Yorick & Bień, Janusz S.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 7, 95-119 (1983) 
Beliefs, Points of View, 
and Multiple Environments* 
YORICK WILKS 
Cognitive Studies Centre 
University of Essex 
JANUSZ BIEN 
Institute of Informatics 
Warsaw University 
The paper describes o system for deoling with nestings of belief in terms of 
the mechanism of computational environment. A method is offered for com- 
puting the beliefs of A about B (ond so on) in terms of the systems existing 
knowledge structures about A and B separately. A proposol for belief percolo- 
tion is put forward: percolation being a side effect of the process of the com- 
putation of nested beliefs, but one which could explain the acquisition of 
unsupported beliefs. It is argued that the mechanism proposed is compatible 
with o general least effort hypothesis concerning human mental functioning. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a model of beliefs for computer understanding of 
natural language and discusses its implications for speech act theory. 
Although using knowledge for language understanding is an artificial 
intelligence (AI) tradition, the relevance of speaker’s knowledge about the 
hearer (and vice versa) was appreciated only recently in the research of the 
Toronto group (Allen & Perrault, 1978; Cohen, 1978). With the exception 
of Bien’s multiple environments approach to natural language (Bien, 1976 
a, b, 1977), modelling the beliefs of the persons only mentioned in the text 
was completely neglected. 
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% WILKS AND MEN 
The following dialogue is perfectly natural: 
USER: Frank is coming tomorrow, I think 
SYSTEM: Perhaps I should leave (I) 
USER: Why? 
SYSTEM: Coming from you that is a warning 
USER: Does Frank dislike you? 
SYSTEM: I don’t know, but you think he does and that is what is im- 
portant now. (11) 
It is clear that to follow this dialogue it is necessary to distinguish the 
user’s beliefs about Frank’s beliefs from the system’s beliefs about Frank’s 
beliefs, and from Frank’s actual beliefs. Such a situation is sufficiently 
common to deserve special attention. 
In this paper we want to tackle the issue generally and to ask the ques- 
tion “What is it to maintain a structure, not only of one’s beliefs about the 
inanimate world, but about beliefs about other individuals and their 
beliefs?” The argument of the paper will be that there can be a very general 
algorithm for the construction of beliefs about beliefs about beliefs or, if 
you wish, models of models of models, or points of view of points of view 
of points of view. 
Its a philosophical cliche that understanding of language is dependent 
upon not only the beliefs of the understander about the world, but his 
beliefs about the beliefs of the speaker and the ways in which those two may 
be different. To adopt a well-known philosophical example (Donnellan, 
1971, which makes the point from a speaker’s point of view), a person at a 
cocktail party may look across the room at a lady whose name he wants to 
know. He does not know her name, but knows she is a teetotaller, although 
he sees her holding a glass with a colorless liquid and an olive in it. Since he 
knows she is a teetotaller, he also knows that it is not a martini. Nonethe- 
less, he wants to ask the person next to him who the lady is. He could ask 
who is the lady drinking a glass of water, which would be consistent with his 
own beliefs, but in fact what he says to his hearer is “Who is the lady over 
there drinking the martini?” He does this in order to get the reply he wants, 
and does it by assuming a belief which he in fact believes to be false, but 
which he believes to be consistent with the beliefs of his hearer. That is to 
say, he believes that his hearer knows the name of the lady in question, but 
does not know that she is a teetotaller and therefore assumes that she is 
drinking what she appears to be drinking. It is a somewhat labored story but 
it makes the point rather well: that we often operate with assumed beliefs 
which we do not in fact hold, but which we attribute to our hearers. In this 
paper we are going to discuss the construction of such entities as the struc- 
tured beliefs of others and how we manipulate and maintain such entities. 
The present paper does not describe the working of actual programs, 
but presents work in the course of being programmed. After we started this 
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work, we discovered the work of the Toronto group (Perrault, Cohen, & 
Allen, 1978). However, we think our proposals differ from theirs in signifi- 
cant respects, and at the conclusion of the paper we shall make clear what 
those differences are. The distinctive features of what we propose will be: 
(a) The metaphorical use of the computer science notion of multiple 
environments for representing the beliefs and their interrelations: 
interpreting an utterance according to someone’s beliefs is viewed 
as running or evaluating the utterance in the appropriate environ- 
ment . 
(b) Another crucial aspect of our approach is that a belief manipulat- 
ing system, which is to be psychologically and computationally 
plausible, must have built into it some limitations on processing, so 
as to accord with the fact that deep nestings of beliefs (while well 
formed in some “competence” sense) are in practice incomprehen- 
sible. Consider just a small part of an example in R.D. Laing’s 
Knots: 
Jack thinks 
he does not know 
what he thinks 
Jill thinks 
he does not know etc. etc. 
We intend our proposals to reflect this aspect of language process- 
ing (largely neglected in more logic-based approaches) that follows 
from real-time understanding with limited resources. 
We have independently argued in the past (Bien, 1977; Wilks, 
1975) for a “least-effort” view of language processing, and the 
present proposals are consistent with that, as we shall show. 
(c) Our means for explicating this will be what we shall later call the 
percolation effecf. a method in which beliefs propagate about a 
belief system in a way not necessarily intended by any believer or 
participant, but which follows as a side-effort of our principal 
algorithm. 
The form of presentation in the paper is discussion of the 
design and operation of a hypothetical language understanding 
system capable, in principle, of performing the role of either of the 
participants in the dialogue quoted above. 
The task we are describing is one of explicating dialogues like this, and 
in particular, the appropriate responses from the system (though the same 
methodology should apply to a modelling of the USER). 
The system has produced replies at points marked (I) and (II) in the 
dialogue above, and the question we shall ask is why should the system say 
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these different things at these different times, and what structure of knowl- 
edge, inference, and beliefs about the User and Frank should be postulated 
in order to produce a dialogue of this type? What we shall argue is that the 
system is running its knowledge about individuals in different environments 
at points (I) and (II), and the difference between them will be crucial for us. 
In order to explain this we shall have recourse to shorthand as follows 
{ FRANK } 
SYSTEM 
to represent what the bearer of the outer name believes about the bearer of 
the inner name, that is to say, what the system believes about Frank. Struc- 
tures like this can be nested so that the following structure 
1 
{ USER } 
FRANK 1 
SYSTEM 
is intended to be shorthand for what the system believes about what Frank 
believes about the user. 
We shall refer to this as a nested environment and every such structure 
is considered to be (trivially) inside the system, for it knows everything there 
is to be known about the individuals mentioned. 
The first important question is, what are the structures that this short- 
hand represents? For the moment, the simplest form of what the system 
believes about Frank, i.e.; 
{ FRANK } 
SYSTEM 
could simply be thought of as a less permanent version of a frame (Char- 
niak, 1978; Minsky, 1975), or more suitably in the terms of Wilks (1977) as 
a pseudo-text or, if you prefer, any knowledge structure whatsoever about 
the individual named inside. The simplest metaphor is that of a can into 
which all incoming information that the bearer of the inner name is thrown. 
This information will have internal structure (and we shall come to that) but 
the nature of the internal structure is not crucial to the argument of this 
paper. The advantage of using the word pseudo-text (PT) and what it was 
defined to mean in that paper, is in the episodic tradition of viewing 
memory: that the structures of information about Frank are unsorted, unre- 
fined (and in that sense, unframelike) items of knowledge which have not 
been reclassified and checked against permanent, semantic, memory. One 
could further this point by saying that the knowledge structure held by the 
sytem about Frank is in some sense only a narrative about Frank. It can be 
thought of as a text representation, and the earlier (Wilks, 1977) paper 
argued that input structures from a semantic parser of natural English could 
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themselves be reasonable memory structures for certain well-defined pur- 
poses. 
The PT’s are packed into memory schemata together with topic-spe- 
cific inference rules, and the difference between pseudo-texts and inference 
rules may often be neglected. 
Again, it is a strong assumption that the representation of the system’s 
beliefs about entities (humans, etc.) and their beliefs is all in the same for- 
mat as more structural beliefs of the system; about itself and its own func- 
tioning. We shall, therefore, propose a very general inference engine that 
will run over PT’s on any topic, and in PT’s nested to any depth, to yield an 
inner environment. 
A further feature of this approach will be the context-dependent 
nature of descriptions within PT’s (cf. Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Norman & 
Bobrow, 1979), and their associated pointers. 
The context dependency of descriptions originally meant that they 
were never more precise than was needed in the context of their creation, 
but we now understand the feature in a broader sense: a given description in 
various contexts may refer to different times. For example, “the murderer” 
in the environment of John’s beliefs may refer to Jones, but, in the environ- 
ment of May’s beliefs, to Smith, In other words, the context-dependent 
descriptions supply us with some power of intensional logic, which is neces- 
sary for an adequate knowledge representation, although in the simplified 
example we use for illustrative purposes below, we shall not make use of 
this feature. 
CONSTRUCTING ENVIRONMENTS 
The essence of this paper is to evaluate and compare two perspectives or en- 
vironments (equals nested PTs) and they will be the ones which are created 
by the system at points II and II in the dialogue above. “Evaluate” as it is 
used here is intended to have a standard computer science meaning-one we 
could put more adventurously as running structural descriptions in given 
environments (Bien, 1977). What this will mean in concrete terms, is to 
draw plausible pragmatic inferences, and in that sense our view of under- 
standing is to be identified with the drawing of such pragmatic inferences in 
context. This is the standard tradition of the AI approach to natural lan- 
guage of the last 10 years. 
In particular, at (I) in the dialogue, the system is evaluating the user’s 
initial remark ‘Frank is coming tomorrow, I think’ in the following nested 
environment 
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i’ { SYSTEM } FRANK USER ‘1 
SYSTEM 
whearas, at Point (II) in the conversation, the system has evaluated just 
Frank’s view of himself, that is to say, he has run the user’s first sentence in 
the simpler environment 
1 
{ SYSTEM } 
FRANK 1 
SYSTEM 
where he discovers that he has no such information on what Frank thinks of 
him. 
If we suppose some parsing of the input sentences into a semantic 
representation, the first question of principle is that of strategies for setting 
up environments. We shall distinguish the presenfafion strafegy and the in- 
sertional strategy. The question for the presentation strategy is this: given 
any incoming information about an individual, how deep a level of nested 
environment should the system construct? A minimal strategy will be ap- 
propriate when, for instance, listening to a mathematics lecture, where one 
is not normally evaluating the input in terms of the presence of the speaker: 
one is not asking oneself “Why is this algebra lecturer telling me this?” and 
evaluating his motives and reasons for doing it. We shall call that a minimal 
strategy that would have a very shallow environment with no level corre- 
sponding to the speaker. 
What we shall call the standard presentation strategy for information 
is the one adopted in the nested environments above, where they are nested 
so as to include a level corresponding to the speaker (the user in this case) 
and then the individuals mentioned. At (I) the system evaluates the initial 
sentence while taking account of the speaker’s motives, but at Point (II) he 
does not take account of the speaker and the speaker/user does not occur in 
the nesting. 
This standard strategy allows a hearer either to disbelieve a speaker or 
to cooperate with him, as he chooses (cf. Taylor & Whitehill 1981). 
In addition to this, we can imagine super-strategies (see further below) 
which are reflexive nestings of speakers and others, as well as the system 
itself. In these the system constructs even deeper environments correspond- 
ing to what it believes about what somebody else believes about what it itself 
believes, etc. We shall call anything deeper than a single nesting using the 
speaker a reflexive strategy, and we shall not consider it here. 
The second important question concerns what we have called insertion 
strategies. When the system reads something as at (I), said by the user about 
Frank, the question arises as to where in the system this should be stored. In 
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the case of the user’s sentence “Frank is coming tomorrow, I think”, 
should the semantic representation of that sentence be stored simply in the 
pseudo-text for the user, the person who said it, or in one for Frank, the 
person spoken about, or both? For reasons that will become clear later, we 
shall adopt a “scatter-gun” strategy, in that the information will be stored 
initially in all the possible places, i.e., both the PT for user and for Frank. 
This is an assumption that may need revision in the light of later experi- 
ment, but the system we are describing is heavily orientated toward redun- 
dant storage of information. For the form of the information to be stored, 
we shall simply assume some simple standard semantic parsing (Wilks, 
1975) so that the user’s statement “Frank is coming tomorrow” will parse 
as the following structure of simple templates 
tomorrow 
where each wor-like item above is itself a pointer to a complex semantic 
representation, and the parsed structure above, for a simple dependency of 
two clauses, indicates the agents (first slot) and actions involved (second 
slot), the objects being dummies (0). This whole structure will be added 
into both { USER } and ( FRANK } . Since all PT’s are in SYSTEM, it is 
not necessary to add this to lowest level PT’s. 
Notice here that the PT’s are general items and will not be stored only 
for individual human beings, but also for groups of humans, objects, sub- 
stances, classes, my car, a jury, a professor, a salesman, sulphur, and Ger- 
many. In Wilks (1977), their hierarchical relations and inheritance relations 
were discussed, and here we may assume that these are standard. In this 
paper we concentrate only on PT’s for agents (we shall explain why later), 
and a consequence of this is that when we consider nested environments, 
PT’s for agents will be the only ones that can be outer environments in 
nesting diagrams. That is, we can consider computing, for example, Jim’s 
view of the oil crisis, but we cannot consider the oil crisis’ view of Jim. We 
can do this for groups as well: we are able to consider Germany’s view of 
the oil crisis, although never the oil crisis’s view of Germany. In the ex- 
amples in this paper, we shall confine ourselves to the names of individuals 
rather than groups or states or classes of individuals as names on the “out- 
side” of PT’s. 
BELIEFS ABOUT AND BELIEFS OF 
A final preliminary distinction we must make is between someone’s beliefs 
about someone and his beliefs about the beliefs ofthat individual. To put it 
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simply, we can have beliefs about Smith-that he is male, 45, etc. We can 
also have beliefs about his beliefs: that Smith believes that Vitamin C cures 
colds. On one general view of belief these are all properties of Smith from 
the believer’s point of view, but they are, of course, importantly different 
sorts of property. 
Earlier, we discursively introduced the knowledge structures (PTs) 
about animate and inanimate entities. Before we get to the heart of our 
paper, which is an algorithm for constructing an environment, or point of 
view that one of the entities represented by a PT can have of another, we 
must discuss in a little more detail that structure of the PTs. In Wilks (1977) 
we introduced a PT as a narrative-like structure, within which was col- 
lected, in a semantic representation, the information the system had about 
some entity or generic class of entities. It was considered separate from a 
semantic definition, as well as from a frame, which was a permanent 
memory structure (Largely of episodic information). A PT was intended to 
be an intermediate memory structure, some of whose contents would un- 
doubtedly be transferred to permanent memory. In Wilks (1977) we ex- 
pressed information about the generic concept of CAR, separate from the 
definition of a car as a people-moving device (a nonessential separation, 
and KRL and Charniak (1978) would have chosen differently at this point), 
and containing material appropriate for a permanent frame (CARS have 
fluid injected into them, so that. . . .etc.), as well as episodic material that 
would not be so transferred (MY CAR is purple). The simple illustrative PT 
of that paper used the symbol * for “car” in its templates because it was not 
a pointer to another definitional semantic formula, PT, or associated frame 
(as WHEEL would be), but to the PT itself in which it occurred. It was thus 
a special pointed carrying, as it were, a warning against vicious self-refer- 
ence. 
In the present case, where individuals are concerned that can them- 
selves have beliefs, we must amend the notation. Suppose we ask where the 
system keeps its knowledge about Frank. He, like the car, will have a 
semantic definition (human, male, etc.), as well as beliefs the system has 
about him (Frank is an alcoholic), as well as beliefs the system has that it ex- 
plicitly believes to be Frank’s beliefs (Frank believes he is a robot, and that 
he is merely a social drinker). Thus Frank’s beliefs, as known to the system, 
can superficially contradict both definitionnl and accidental information 
about himself, if we may use an old fashioned distinction here (again, 
nothing crucial depends on it). 
One also has a pretty firm intuition that the structure of Frank’s own 
beliefs (as believed to be his by the system, of course) are rather different 
from beliefs about him. And yet if, for administrative and computational 
convenience, we want to keep the system’s view of Frank in one place, these 
should all in some sense be in the box marked “Frank” (different though 
they are). There is an additional complication, which will be very important 
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when we come to a proposed algorithm, that many of the system’s beliefs 
about Frank also, as a matter of fact, correspond to his own beliefs, even 
though we have no direct evidence of the correspondence. That is to say, the 
system believes Frank to be a human, even though, oddly enough, he 
believes himself to be a robot and that is known to the system. However, the 
system believes Frank to have two hands and so does Frank, even though 
the system has never heard him say so. All this will fall under the general 
rule we shall use later, that X’s view of Y can be assumed to be one’s own 
view of Y, except where one has explicit evidence to the contrary; and this 
rule also covers X’s view of Y! 
In the sample, over-simplified PT below we shall continue to indicate 
mention of Frank, in the PT for Frank (i.e., the system’s beliefs about all 
aspects of Frank), by *. This is again (as in Wilks, 1977) a pointer warning 
against vicious self-reference. We shall not include the semantic definition 
in the PT (as Charniak would), and the * pointer (after Kleene’s star) may 
be considered as pointing to the semantic formula definition, which in turn 
points to the PT. This is just as the “Earth” in the sample below is also a 
pointer to the corresponding semantic formula definition and PT, though 
with no risk of self-reference in this case. The belief “Earth is flat” is in- 
serted precisely because it is an odd, and so reportable, belief. “Earth is 
round” would not be so inserted for a PT for a round-earther simply be- 
cause it could be inherited from the lattice of common knowledge from the 
PT for EDUCATED HUMAN. 
Thus in the sample PT below, the semantic formula definition is not 
present but assumed, and the horizontal line simply divides the beliefs 
above it (which are explicitly believed by the system to be Frank’s, and so 
can be thought of as prefaced by an implicit * BELIEVES. . . .) from those 
below which are beliefs about Frank, that may or may not be his. In some 
clear sense those above the line are a sort of “inner Frank” and the dif- 
ferent function they have when we construct a “push-down” algorithm to 
create environments, will become clear. 
So, the following might be trivial content for a PT ( FRANK } : 
SYSTEM 
User dislikes* 
SYSTEM 
The line across the PT separates beliefs believed to be of Frank (above the 
line) from those believed about Frank (below it). We shall have to exercise 
great care with the line because, in practice, some below-line beliefs will be 
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believed by their object: if I say of Frank that he hates dogs, I may put that 
below the line, but a simple pragmatic inference rule would lift it above. 
As a shorthand, above-the-line beliefs only will be underlined. 
PUSHING DOWN ENVIRONMENTS 
We are now approaching the heart of the paper. Pushing down one of the 
PTs inside another means resetting values in the PT being pushed down. 
The transitory object achieved by this method of environment we shall in- 
terpret as being the other PT holder’s view of the inner PT object. Suppose 
we want to construct the system’s view of the user’s view of Frank 
1 
( FRANK 1 
USER I 
SYSTEM 
We shall assume this is done in two stages as follows: first by constructing, 
or having available, the system’s view of Frank; second by constructing, or 
having available, the system’s view of the user, and then pushing the former 
down into the latter to achieve the system’s view of the user’s view of Frank: 
1 FRANK }~SER } => { FRANK } 
SYSTEM SYSTEM 1 USER I 
SYSTEM 
Suppose the content of the outer PT, the system’s view of the user, contains 
the proposition “User dislikes Frank”, and the inner PT, the system’s view 
of Frank, contains the proposition “User likes Frank”, believed by Frank 
(and hence underlined in our simple notation) 
I USER 
FRANK 
USER LIKES * 
SYSTEM 
l DISLIKES FRANK 
SYSTEM 
One of our major assumptions in this paper is that the system does not pre- 
serve complex constructions of environments; the complex points of view. 
It maintains structures only at the bottom level: in terms of our earlier crude 
metaphore, it maintains simply a row of PTs about individuals (and other 
entities) and not environments, i.e., not push-downs of points of view. If 
the system, by pushing one of these down into the other as we postulated, 
wishes to construct the inner environment which, in this case, is the system’s 
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the outer belief on the inner belief. We shall consider outer beliefs migrating 
or percolating into the inner environment and then examine their mutual in- 
teraction. 
However, it should be clear that only “upper half” templates of a PT 
can migrate into the inner environment and override what it contains. If I 
want to consider what User thinks of Frank, I will let my beliefs about the 
User’s view of Frank override my views of Frank, but not, in general, my 
views of the User. 
However, the matter is not quite so simple for certain attitude verbs 
like dislike. If I say X dislikes Y, I imply X believes he dislikes Y except in 
exceptional circumstances, or, in a simple rule: for a class of “conscious at- 
titude” verbs, we have: 
X 
human 
dislike Y] =>$ ;;I;: f 3 
Again, if I believe Smith is 6 feet tall, I imply he believes he is 6 feet tall, as 
much as I assume he accepts his own “semantic definition” (male, human, 
etc.). We shall return to the problem of self-knowledge later. 
Let us now consider in more detail the push-down of the system’s view 
of Frank into the system’s view of the User, and assume the following 
propositions as constituting a slightly more complex PT for the system’s 
view of Frank. 
i 
FRANK 
Vitamin C cures colds 
User likes l 
*  dislikes user 
SYSTEM 1 
Now consider this in relation to a more complex view of the system’s view 
of the user: 
USER 
Vitamin C not cure colds 
Frank believes 0 
C Vitamin C cures colds 
t dislikes Frank 
Frank likes * 
Frank dislikes system 
+ is an alcoholic 
SYSTEM / 
In this example we see the more complex two-clause proposition: the one 
that expresses the system’s belief that the user believes Frank believes that 
Vitamin C cures colds. If we now consider the first of these to be pushed 
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down into the second, we achieve a complex item like the following example 
in which the arrows show the interaction as the relevant outer propositions 
percolate into the inner environment. This is fundamentally simple, and we 
now want to discuss one-by-one the interactions that are obtained by this 
method. We have numbered the linkages 1,2, 3, and 4 to show four separate 
percolations “inwards” (templates shown ringed). 
USER 
I FRANK 
(0 1 fl@IrninC cures 3. co1 s 
User likes *” - L -\ 
1 
I 
I 
/ 
Vitamin C 
c Frank 
not cures colds 
believes 0 
dislikes 
dislikes 
likes 
Frank 
system 
l 
* is an alcoholic 
The two dotted lines show those templates that mount to the upper half of 
( FRANK ) via the inference rule. Other percolations remain in the lower 
half, except the one marked 1 whose content requires the upper-half beliefs. 
What we have to consider is those propositions in the outer PT being 
drawn into the inner pseudo-text by a relevance criterion, given that they are 
above the line in the outer PT, for only explicit beliefs of the user can over- 
ride anything inside the (bottom half of) the inner PT. Our diagrammatic 
distinction of the upper and lower halves of the PT is thus a notation for 
limiting inference. We shall discuss the criterion that causes it to be con- 
sidered relevant further below but, for the moment, we take an over-simple 
criterion of explicit mention in the outer PT (upper half) of the “holder” of 
the inner PT. 
1. We have the proposition “Frank believes that Vitamin C cures 
colds.” This enters the inner PT and in appropriate-reduced form, 
“Vitamin C cures colds” is just another copy of the system’s belief 
about Frank. 
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2. In the inner PT 
{ FRANK } 
SYSTEM 
we have the system’s belief that Frank believes that the user likes 
him, and in the outer PT we have the relevant belief of the system 
of the user that the user dislikes Frank. The latter comes in to the 
inner PT as “User dislikes Frank,” but into its bottom half, not 
immediate as a belief of Frank. There is, of course, no contradic- 
tion between these, because the inference rule given does not 
generate any contradiction. 
3. The belief in the outer PT “Frank dislikes system” is drawn into 
the inner environment and meets no contradiction of any kind so it 
simply remains there. We shall have cause to refer back to this later 
as a crucial percolation. 
4. We have in the outer PT the belief held by the user that Frank likes 
him. This is drawn in and, given the inference rule above, contra- 
dicts the inner belief of Frank that he, Frank, dislikes the user. The 
inner belief that he, Frank, dislikes the user is explicitly contra- 
dicted and overwritten by the outer belief Frank likes user. The *s 
change reference, since they refer to the local subject of the PT, the 
incoming belief taking the form “* likes User”. 
The result of these four operations in the inner environment is now the con- 
struction 
1 
( FRANK } 
USER 
SYSTEM 
I 
that is to say, the system’s view of the user’s view of Frank. So we now have 
an inner result as shown above in the inner environment. 
The reader will recall the two heuristics used in order to obtain this in- 
termediate result. First, the relevance heuristic: the basis for considering 
outer PT propositions (from the “upper” explicit belief part) as being 
possible migrants into the inner environment. The criterion has been explicit 
mention, of Frank in this case, in the outer propositions. The reader should 
not assume that the beliefs listed in the two example PTs were chosen as 
relevant to the example: the original example dialogue referred to Frank 
hating the user, which was in a PT, but there was nothing relevant to the ex- 
ample about his views on Vitamin C and its efficacy. Those were drawn into 
the inner environment simply by the general relevance mechanism. There 
will, of course, be considerable practical problems caused by conjunction, 
disjunction, etc. given a richer PT structure. Moreover, the present criterion 
of relevance (explicit mention) is far too naive: in fact, there will not nor- 
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mally be relevance only by name, but also by descriptions. So, for example, 
Frank may not appear in the outer propositions as his name “Frank”, but 
under some description such as “John’s father,” in which case much more 
complex inference procedures will be required to establish the relevance of 
the corresponding outer proposition. This is a general problem for all artifi- 
cial intelligence systems of this type and no peculiar difficulties arise here. 
Second, confradiction: inner beliefs survive unless contradicted by outer 
ones from the upper, explicit, half. Any inner beliefs which is not contra- 
dicted survives. 
The reader may ask at this point what is the function of the heuristics 
and construction we have produced, and upon what general intuition do 
they rest. The assumption is that of basic common sense: that one’s view of 
another person’s view of a third person (and so on) is simply that it is the 
same as one’s own view unless one has explicit reason to believe otherwise. 
This sounds extremely simple but, as we have seen, there are considerable 
complications in working out even this very common sense principle. 
At this point let us recall why we have performed this environment 
construction. The initial example of dialogue required the first environment 
(at the point marked (I)). 
(’ 
{ SYSTEM } 
FRANK 
USER ‘I 
SYSTEM 
This is obtained in two such push-down moves. First, 
i 
( FRANK ) 
USER 1 
SYSTEM 
which we have just done, and then the full nesting by pushing down 
( SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM 
into that. After applying these two moves, we shall achieve the inner en- 
vironment required at point (I) in the example. Let us now consider two ef- 
fects of the pushdown environment achieved. First, within 
1’ 
{ SYSTEM } 
FRANK 
USER ‘1 
SYSTEM 
we now have the percolated proposition “Frank dislikes system”, and we 
also have from our parsed input “User asserts that Frank comes tomor- 
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row.” Notice that this belief would not have percolated into the alternative 
environment 
1 
{ SYSTEM ) 
FRANK 1 
SYSTEM 
constructed at point (II) in the example, because the belief originated in 
( USER ) 
SYSTEM 
which is not involved here. 
Therefore, if we now have appropriate inference rules we can 
generate: 
“Perhaps I (system) should leave” in the innermost environment, if 
we suppose’ some common sense inference rule of the following type: 
EN 
* 
;IjI,. <I 
=> 
1 * LEAVE x3 
We shall not defend specific inference rules here, but only assume that 
they have a function in general semantic parsing systems of the present type; 
similar rules exist in many other systems. If we now match this rule onto the 
contents of the inner environment we have, we shall see the first line matches 
with the proposition obtained through push-down, “Frank dislikes the 
system”. The rest of the lefthand side matches the parsed input: a human Y, 
which is the user, asserts the human X, which is Frank, approaches the ob- 
ject, which is the system, the l since we are in a system PT (the innermost). 
From these we infer, by rule, the output “*leaves,” that is to say, the system 
leaves. Thus we have the motivation of the system’s reply at (I) in the origi- 
nal dialogue. This inference rule could appear as a partial plan in a more 
fully-developed speech act system. 
In any actual operation it would probably help to have a rule, such as 
the one above, stored as part of a class of rules which we might label 
WARN. It is here that the belief manipulations of this paper bear upon the 
general topic of speech acts. If it were procedurally useful to have a class of 
such rules stored under a primitive lable like WARN, then it would give 
justification for the use of speech act terminology as part of belief systems 
of this type. The problem is that this would be a very weak defense of 
‘See Section 6. 
110 WILKS AND BIEN 
speech acts because, as with all primitives (like WARN in this case), it can 
be argued (Charniak, 1975) that the taxonomy of items one proposes could 
be maintained without primitive labels. Per that view, one could have a 
classification of inference rules available, but would not be helped further 
by special labels for the classes (such as warn, threat, promise, assert, etc.) 
in order to access that rule class. 
PERCOLATION 
A second result of the push-down we have arrived at is that the proposition 
“Frank dislikes the system” can now be retained in the inner PT if we adopt 
what we shall call the ‘percolation heuristic”. This is as follows: when a 
proposition has appeared in an inner environment, and is not contradicted, 
it remains there in the standard copy of that inner PT when that copy issub- 
sequently re-established at bottom level. We shall say the proposition 
“Frank dislikes the system” has percolated from the “outer” PT 
{ USER } 
SYSTEM 
into the “inner” PT 
{ FRANK } 
SYSTEM ’ 
After the example dialogue has been dealt with, the inner PT is, as it 
were, pulled out and remains the system’s view of Frank. The percolation 
heuristic which asserts that “Frank dislikes the system” stays in that copy* 
for the future. By iterative percolation, it will also have gone further into 
the innermost environment 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM 
as “Frank dislikes the system”. We shall argue that on a least-effort princi- 
ple of belief manipulations, this percolation heuristic is justified. But first 
let us consider an immediate potential counter-example. Supposing the user 
had said “Frank thinks you’re crazy, but I don’t”. We might imagine a con- 
tradiction achieved by percolation into the innermost environment (which is 
the system’s view of the user’s view of Frank’s view of the system), where 
we might have mutually contradictory percolations: both “The system is 
crazy”, and “The system is not crazy.” In fact, if we follow this in detail, 
we find this does not happen: the worst that can happen is a contradiction in 
IThis allows the possibility of multiple copies of a PT for Frank and hence the problem 
of which is most sulienr in later retrieval (see Bien, 1980). 
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the system’s view of the user’s beliefs after percolation. Moreover, none of 
us find anything disturbing about the idea that others (rather than our- 
selves) have contradictory beliefs. Nevertheless, although no contradiction 
follows here, we might well want to have certain surface key words inhibit 
multi step percolations, in this case “but”. 
The principle suggested here is that percolations remain for all future 
use of a given PT, not just in relation to the PT from which they percolated. 
Another result of percolation will be that 
( FRANK } 
SYSTEM 
is no longer the general representation of Frank, for beliefs about him may 
percolate anywhere in the system’s PTs. 
One argument for the percolation heuristic is based on the assumption 
that pushing down PTs inside each other to create environments requires 
considerable computational, or psychological, effort; with greater effort re- 
quired for greater nesting depths. Allowing beliefs to percolate about the 
system in the suggested way, avoids having to recompute the same environ- 
ment by repeating a push-down should another dialogue by encountered 
that required the same environment. Before running a sentence representa- 
tion in an environment, we can check the push-down nesting required and 
examine a flag in the innermost PT to see whether that inner environment 
had been constructed recently or not. The notion of recency would have to 
be firmly defined but, if the sentence representation had been run recently 
on any such definition, we would assume that percolations and settlings of 
consistencies had been done and would not need to be repeated. 
An important point here is that the push-downs are not in any sense 
topic-guided: that is to say, if the text required us to calculate Reagan’s view 
of Begin’s view of the oil problem, then we could not be sure that, if we 
were to assemble the same order of nesting of outer PTs for another topic, 
say Reagan’s view of Begin’s view of Saudi Arabia, then the register of 
previous push-downs would mean that all possible consistencies and per- 
colations had already been achieved in the innermost environment (since 
they would have been directed by relevance to oil). However, our overall 
least-effort principle of comprehension requires that we do not repeat the 
outer part of that push-down, which would have been constructed already. 
It must be remembered that the push-down metaphor is merely a 
metaphor. The actual computation involved in computing the inner en- 
vironments is a cross product of PT contents. However, it might turn out 
experimentally that the assumption here about percolation is not suitable 
for all topics. We might, on the basis of experiment, wish to restrict percola- 
tion itself to certain topics or psychological modes, in particular those of at- 
titudes. What is being suggested here, in psychological terms, under the 
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metaphor of percolation, is that it is essentially a side-effect that transfers 
beliefs for which one does not have explicit evidence. There is a phenome- 
non called the sleeper effect (Gruder, et al., 1978) which is well attested, and 
yields experimental evidence about how people come to hold beliefs for 
which they have no direct evidence of any kind. We take this as indirect evi- 
dence that something along the lines we propose for percolation could in 
fact be experimentally tested. 
PERCOLATION AND THE ABOUT/OF BELIEF DIVISION 
It will be clear from the earlier detailed discussion of the sample push-down, 
that it is normally only the upper-half beliefs of the lower PT that migrate 
into the lower half of the PT being pushed down. The diagrammatic upper 
and lower half metaphor expresses this conveniently, but the motivation is 
also clear: it is, in general, the system’s beliefs about the lower PT-holder’s 
beliefs that will modify the beliefs stored in the (lower half of) the upper, or 
pushing-down, PT. As we saw, beliefs in the lower PT that explicitly refer 
to the beliefs in other PTs (e.g., USER BELIEVES FRANK BELIEVES 
VITAMIN C CURES COLDS) will naturally migrate to the upper or inner 
part of a pushing-down PT. 
The upper and lower half of a PT metaphor has, of course, no appli- 
cation to a PT for an inanimate entity or entities (except perhaps com- 
puters) since they do not have the inner beliefs. So we can think of a PT for 
coal as having all its content below some notional line, and nothing above. 
Thus, nothing can be pushed down into such a PT, and when it is pushed 
down into some other (animate) PT (so as to construct, for example, some- 
one’s beliefs about coal) all migrations will be into its lower half. There will 
be the standard status problems about whether PTs for such entities as 
France and The Auto Workers’ Union can have beliefs. 
One further clarification is needed of the meaning of the percolation 
heuristic proper, as opposed to beliefs migrating into an inner PT on some 
relevance criterion. Percolations are those beliefs that migrate into a lower 
half of an upper PT and are nol contradicfed’. It is those, we suggest, that 
may remain in the resulting permanent copy of the upper PT. 
‘Where contradiction also covers those contradictions reached via inference rules, as in 
John is married IO Mary 
and 
Fred says John is married to Rita 
inside { JOHN } 
i 1 
FRED 
SYSTEM 
the latter sentence overrides and contradicts the former, only given some rule such as 
X IS MARRIED TO Y =>X IS NOT MARRIED TO Z (#Y) 
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The key example in the discussion was FRANK DISLIKES THE SYS- 
TEM. Now, we have suggested that on withdrawal of the upper PT from 
the push-down, such a belief might remain, with its source believer stripped 
away, as it were, and so be a belief of the system that it had merely inherited 
as a side-effect. It will be clear that such persistence could not apply to 
beliefs that had migrated in and overriden inner beliefs: as FRANK LIKES 
USER migrated into { FRANK } and contradicted/overrode FRANK 
DISLIKES USER. If that were to remain in a permanent copy, any push- 
down might cause the sytem randomly to reverse its beliefs: e.g., having cal- 
culated Begin’s view of Reagan and finding it the reverse of its own, it 
would not be likely to reverse its own beliefs on Reagan just from having 
constructed that particular environment! 
Two other important topics have been left in an incomplete state, and 
will require further discussion in another paper: first, what classes of beliefs 
can be inferred pragmatically to be those of their subject and, second and 
closely related, are “self-pushdowns” significantly different from the 
general case, i.e., 
( FRANK ) 
FRANK 
from 
{ FRANK ) 
USER 
We noted earlier that there is a class of attitude beliefs that we would 
expect to migrate from the lower to upper halves of a PT, e.g., 
X DISLIKES Y => X BELIEVES (X DISLIKES Y) 
Again, one would expect the same inference to hold for: 
(a) all parts of a semantic definition,’ unless explicitly overriden; 
X IS HUMAN => X BELIEVES (X IS HUMAN) 
(b) all parts inherited from a “lattice of common knowledge PTs”; 
X IS AN ARCHITECT => X BELIEVES (X CAN-PLAN 
BUILDINGS) 
(c) what Clark and Carlson (in press) have, following Schiffer, called 
mutual knowledge; for example, when X and Y observe a candle, an infinite 
number of propositions such as 
X KNOWS Y KNOWS THERE IS A CANDLE 
can be inferred by a simple rule of construction (in which the superficial dif- 
ferences between know and believe are not significant). There has been 
‘In Wilks (1977), semantic definitions were started separately from PTs, rather than 
together as in Charniak (1978). but nothing here depends on that. 
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much misunderstanding about the degree to which Clark and Marshall 
(1981) thought that such complex nested entities were really (rather than 
trivially) constructed by participants. However, it is clear that in certain 
complex situations, such as detective stories, independent evidence can be 
offered for a number of levels of such nestings in situations more complex 
than mere copresence with an object (such as a candle). These situations do 
not collapse trivially (or, conversely, are not trivially inferrable by a recur- 
sive rule) and are more like the processing of (non-collapsing) center em- 
beddings: 
The dog the cat the man saw bit died. 
In those cases, deep nestings are very hard to compute and handle for sub- 
jects, and this is additional evidence supporting our “least-effort” view of 
environments. One could view the present paper as a beginning for a pro- 
cedural account of limitations on (non-trivial) “mutual knowledge” em- 
beddings. 
(d) A natural additional inference would be; 
X ASSERT P => X BELIEVE P 
unless there was any indication of, or reason to suspect, lying by X. 
Indeed, application of this rule makes the basic inference to the sys- 
tems dialogue reply far clearer because 
&E?izk-f’, 
TOMOkROW 
is replaced by a belief form, which enters the inner environment, and the 
response is then generated by a simplified, and more plausible, inference 
rule 
[ (HUM X) DISLIKE (HUM Y) ] 
c (HUM X) APPROACH (HUM Y) ] 
=> 
c y (MOVE AWAY) ‘73 
SELF-EMBEDDING 
A topic that has been touched on, but not confronted, is that of an individ- 
ual’s view of himself, and the ways in which this does not conform to our 
general heuristic for the computation of points of view: someone else’s view 
of X is my view except where I believe that not to be the case. 
No problem arises with the system’s self-model: the PT 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM 
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has all its content above the line (to continue the demarcation line meta- 
phor). There are no beliefs the system has about the system that are not its 
own beliefs. 
More interesting cases arise when the system wishes to compute 
Frank’s view of himself or Frank’s view of the system: i.e., 
( FRANK ) 
FRANK 
SYSTEM 
or 
( SYSTEM ) 
FRANK 
SYSTEM 
It would be reasonable to assume that Frank’s view of himself is, in 
general, the same as my view of him except where I have evidence to the 
contrary. Our main heuristic would create an environment in which Frank 
believes his address to be what I believe it to be; his number of eyes to be 
what I believe it to be; but his number of teeth to be the value of what he 
believes it to be (and not the empty slot that I have); and so on. In other 
words, Frank may well have beliefs, concrete and abstract, that I know 
nothing about, but given the limitations on my beliefs, my best construction 
is still to believe that his beliefs are as mine (except for the listed exceptions 
that I am aware of, and the special treatment of empty slots). So, we might 
say, for the first of these situations behaviorism is a safe intellectual policy. 
What about the second case: the computation of Frank’s view of the 
system? Here the general heuristic must surely break down, because the 
system cannot assume that Frank has access to all the beliefs about itself 
that it has. The situation is the inverse of the earlier one as regards the 
evaluation of slot fillers, for if we applied the general heuristic to a system 
that believed itself to be human and believed a particular figure for its 
number of teeth, we would construct an inner environment in which Frank 
would have the system’s own beliefs about its number of teeth, which is not 
at all plausible. One simply knows oneself better than others do, and that 
fact has concrete expression for oneself (although that implies nothing 
about behaviorism and the degree to which others could, in principle, know 
as much about one as one does oneself). Though in the case of one’s beliefs 
about others, one believes they know more about themselves than one does 
oneself, but nothing follows from that (if one knew what such things were 
they would be known to one, ex hypothesi). 
However, it ought to be possible for the system to ask and answer the 
question: “What is Frank’s view of me?“, if only because this is a common 
and troublesome question in everyday life. If we apply the heuristic to com- 
pute: 
116 WllKS AND BIEN 
{ SYSTEM ) 
FRANK I 
SYSTEM 
we would get Frank’s explicit beliefs about the system (as believed by the 
system), and the upper half of 
{ FRANK ) 
SYSTEM 
migrating into the lower half of 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM 
which was (see above) previously empty, since all the system’s beliefs about 
itself are necessarily its beliefs. We must assume that Frank’s beliefs about 
the system also include some of the list (a)-(d) above, semantic definitional 
knowledge, copresence information, as well as general information from 
the higher level PT { HUMAN } , or of course { COMPUTER } , if the 
system has been found out for what it is. However, this does not add up to 
much, if the inner environment is to be limited (as it seems it must be in this 
special case) to the lower hot” of the inner 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM ’ 
so as to avoid the system assuming Frank knows all the things about it that 
it does. 
More thought is required on this issue, and a solution may be found 
(in the sense of a psychologically plausible solution) via a special PT for the 
system’s view of its public self (i.e., what it believes to be the public’s view 
of it, including what it is publically believed to believe about itself). But it 
would seem a pity to introduce a special entity here; one that ought to be 
constructible from the entities already available in the system, lest such en- 
tities have to be produced in some form for all other entities in the system. 
Such entities would not fit with the general assumptions of this paper 
because they would be essentially stored push-downs instead of everything 
being stored at the lowest level, as we have assumed, for the entity proposed 
would be: 
1 
( SYSTEM } 
AVERAGE MAN 1 
SYSTEM 
A way of avoiding this would be for there to be beliefs in the lower 
half of 
( SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM 
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and for them to be the system’s beliefs about the average man’s view of the 
system’s self. If there were present, then the general heurisic would run 
properly. 
It needs to be emphasised that all operations in the system are, in some 
sense, self-embedding since all the PTs are the system’s PTs and are trivially 
indexed from 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM ’ 
i.e., only a minute fraction of the system’s real beliefs are actually in the up- 
per part of 
{ SYSTEM } 
SYSTEM . 
But the system should be able to distinguish between what it believes about 
elephants, and what the average man believes about them. After all, the 
system might be an expert on elephants and any simple minded application 
of the general heuristic would again be wrong. The plausible solution here 
is again a pointer from the upper half of the PT ( AVERAGE WESTERN 
MAN } to the system’s own beliefs as default, but with “expertise areas” 
segregated in those of the system’s PTs about which it is an expert (corre- 
sponding perhaps, even in the semantic definitions, to Putnam’s “division 
of linguistic labor”). 
Some, on reading this, will want to argue for reverse or outward per- 
colations, but we would claim that on detailed inspection such cases all turn 
out to be (inward) percolations falling under the general heuristic rule. The 
most obvious case would be the inverse of X believes p&p, namely, p (in 
one of the system’s PTs)+Average man believes p. However, this is 
accounted for (without any “reverse percolation”) by this default arrange- 
ment of pointers. 
CONCLUSION 
Enormous gaps in what has been described here will immediately be evident 
to the reader. First, we have said little about the nature of the organization 
of the inference rules and their relationship to plans. This is in part deliber- 
ate, for there are many systems for which plans are central, and planning is 
a relatively well understood sub-topic in AI. The specific claims of this 
paper do not bear on that issue. Second, we have noted that a system like 
this could not be serious until augmented by intensional logic notions, such 
as being able to show the equivalence of Dolores to John’s mother, for ex- 
ample, or Frank to Jack’s father. Without this any kind of relevance 
heuristic for deciding what, in an outer PT, should be allowed to percolate 
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into an inner, would be inadequate. Third, we have said nothing about the 
relationship of the intermediate (and partly episodic) PTs to permanent 
memory frame, but again this is a subject of study in many other systems 
and no specific problems concerning that issue arise here. 
Finally, something should be said about the differences between this 
work and work on speech acts and plans done at Toronto by Perrault, Allen 
and Cohen (see Allen & Perrault, 1978; Cohen, 1978). One is their emphasis 
on plans, which are not of central concern to us. A second, and fundamen- 
tal, difference is that in the Toronto systems, all possible perspectives on 
beliefs are already considered as computed. That is to say, if, in a Toronto 
system, you want to know what the system believes the user’s belief about 
Frank’s belief about the system is, you can simply examine an inner parti- 
tion of a set of beliefs that has already been constructed and where it is 
already explicitly stored. This is the exact opposite point of view to that 
adopted in this paper, which is that such inner environments are not already 
stored and previously computed, but are constructed when needed and 
then, as it were, taken apart again, subject to what we call percolation. You 
can see the difference by asking yourself if you already know what Reagan 
thinks Begin thinks of Gaddafi. If you think you already know without cal- 
culation, then you will be inclined to the Toronto view that such inner belief 
partitions are already constructed. If you think that in some sense, con- 
sciously or unconsciously, you have to think it out, you will lean towards a 
constructivist hypothesis, such as the one advanced in this paper. In the 
Toronto view, there is no place for least-effort hypothesis of understanding. 
A fundamental principle of our system is that the points of view are kept, 
wherever possible, at a single (bottom) level, unless input comes in explicitly 
stating what person A believes about person or entity B. 
The system presented in this paper is in the course of being pro- 
grammed but, in the form offered here, is essentially a model containing 
ideas about how to explicate a difficult problem in language understanding. 
Two things have not concerned us: first, the precise relation of this work to 
the analysis of speech acts, direct and indirect. These phenomena have been 
addressed within an AI context (Cohen, Allen, Perrault, q.v.), but we be- 
lieve a rather different treatment of them will follow naturally-in a later 
paper-from the prolegomena on belief set out here; one in which the detec- 
tion of a speech act as being a speech act of particular type will involve more 
curtailed stereotypical reasoning (speech act reasoning as “frame-like”, as 
it were, rather than plan-or deduction-like), rather than being in the more 
extended form of those working in the tradition of Searle (1969). 
However, we would claim that the belief analysis presented here can 
be decoupled from this general problem by assuming a parsing into some 
semantic representation (and the PTs have been a rhetorical rather than a 
truly technical device in this paper), and passing over the complex problems 
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of the taxonomy of the inference rules we have assumed. Even if a reader is 
unwilling to grant this “decoupling” of activities, the proposed computa- 
tion of nested beliefs can be judged independently, in terms of its psycho- 
logical and other experimental consequences. 
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